Far be it from me to recommend a person spend time out of their busy day to slog through a judicial opinion on church-state matters. That's what you count on me for, right? But if you are interested in the issue of legislative prayer -- that is, official prayer opening government meetings -- you should take a few minutes to read the opinion filed yesterday enjoining the Sussex County (DE) Council from implementing their prayer practice because it is likely to be found unconstitutional. The discussion section (pages 7-16) offers an especially clear explanation of the issues involved and the precedent controlling, without losing the complexity or delicacy of the analysis.

The bottom line -- for those who still would rather not (I can't blame you) -- is that while the Supreme Court has left a broad opportunity for government bodies to open meetings with prayer, there are limitations that keep the state from crossing the line into endorsement of a particular faith. Here, Sussex County's Council delivered a distinctly Christian prayer (The Lord's Prayer) before most every meeting. That close affiliation with the Christian faith, the court rightly concludes, runs afoul of the First Amendment. 

The fact that The Lord's Prayer has been the only prayer recited at the beginning of Council meetings for over six years is likely to be found to demonstrate that the Council gives Christianity an unconstitutionally preferred status, sending a message to meeting attendees that the Council is promoting the beliefs of Christianity. ...
The Council's advancement of Christianity likely violates the principle that "citizens should come to public meetings confident in the assurance that government plays no favorites in matters of faith but welcomes the participation of all."

The defense in this case offered up the troubling argument that perhaps The Lord's Prayer was not in fact distinctly Christian, and they argued that to improperly advance religion, the Council would have to have actively proselytized. The judge rejected both arguments (beginning on page 18). In issuing the injunction that would halt the practice, the judge delayed its effect for a month to give the parties time to work out a solution.