Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act addresses issues of discrimination in employment. If you are an employer, Title VII is what keeps you from hiring and firing solely on the basis of race, gender or religion. But exceptions have been carved out--surely religious institutions may hire on the basis of religion, right?
But is that exemption assumed in every religious personnel decision regardless of circumstance? What if the employer offered no religious justification for the firing of a chaplain? What if the chaplain was told she was being fired solely for being female (which was not in question at her hiring)? What if the chaplain refused to assist in the coverup of illegal activity by said employer? Yesterday a panel of the US Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 2-1 that, assuming those things to be true, a chaplain's lawsuit in Petruska v. Gannon University must be allowed to proceed, overturning a District Court's dismissal under the ministerial exception. The dissent raised a similarly compellng question: How can the decisions relating to hiring/firing a chaplain ever be truly separated from religious beliefs? Isn't that decision always, ultimately, a religious one?
This decision could easily end up being heard by the US Supreme Court. It seems to knowingly break with other Circuits' rulings that the ministerial exception is, essentially, without bounds when it comes to hiring and firing of faith-related duties. And it's easy to understand why that level of discretion has been allowed: courts surely shouldn't be engaged in deciding internal church matters, particularly when it comes to the performance of religious duties. Still, this case offers a unique set of allegations.
Oh, and to make things a wee bit more complex, did I mention that the author of the decision, Edward Becker, died just prior to its release?
You can read the entire 77-page decision here. But then what would I be for? Choice quotes from the majority opinion, and the dissent, below the fold.
{Note: This post has been slightly edited to try and weed out some of my inaccuracies/ignorance. Hopefully I got them all... db}
From the Majority Opinion:
Employment discrimination unconnected to religious belief, religious doctrine, or the internal regulations of a church is simply the exercise of intolerance, not the free exercise of religion that the Constitution protects. Furthermore, in adjudicating suits that do not involve religious rationales for employment action, courts need not consider questions of religious belief, religious doctrine, or internal church regulation, a process that would violate the Establishment Clause by entangling courts in religious affairs.
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When a religious organization fires or demotes a woman on the basis of sex, it may be acting according to religious belief, religious doctrine, or church regulation (consider, for example, the Catholic Church’s prohibition of female priests). In such a case, the religious organization would be immune from a Title VII suit. But a religious institution might also fire a woman because the individuals making the decision are, simply put, sexist. Religious doctrine and internal church regulation play no role in such a decision.
Considering the complaint in the light most favorable to Petruska, we must conclude that this is the latter type of case: Under the pleadings, Petruska was fired due to sexism unmoored from religious principle. Nothing in the complaint suggests that, as a matter of Catholic doctrine, women cannot serve as university chaplains; indeed, Petruska was hired as Gannon’s chaplain. The complaint alleges that sexism and sexual harassment at Gannon are rampant and points to no religious justification for this alleged state of affairs.
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Preventing a church from hiring ministers in accordance with its own beliefs would inhibit its ability to put its doctrines into practice and would therefore violate the Free Exercise Clause. Furthermore,
such litigation would entangle courts in religious matters, in violation of the Establishment Clause.
This case, however, is about something completely different. Petruska alleges that she was demoted because of animus against women that had nothing to do with religious beliefs, religious doctrine, or internal regulation.
While several of our sister circuits have opined that the employer’s reasons are irrelevant to the ministerial exception, see supra pp. 10-11, we conclude that these reasons make all the difference.
From the dissent:
I disagree with the majority’s fundamental premise that a church’s choice regarding who performs particular spiritual functions is not necessarily a religious decision. Rather, in my view, such a decision is, by its very nature, a religious one. Consequently, government interference with that decision necessarily infringes on a church’s free exercise of religion and entangles the courts in religious matters. I would therefore apply the ministerial exception to any claim which limits a church’s right to choose who will perform particular spiritual functions, without regard to whether it articulates an independent justification based on “religious belief, religious doctrine, or internal regulation.”
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A minister is not merely an employee of the church; she is the embodiment of its message. A minister serves as the church’s public representative, its ambassador, and its voice to the faithful. As the Fifth Circuit explained: “The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose.”
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By rejecting this basic premise, the majority effectively declines to adopt a ministerial exception, placing this Court at odds with every other federal court of appeals to consider the issue.
